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Introduction: ‘Post-Truth’? 
 
 
Much has been written about ‘post-truth’ in the last few years. But little 
by philosophers. Given that it is philosophy which has as an utterly 
central concern thinking (about) the notion of truth, this is possibly 
surprising. 
Perhaps philosophers think that the matter is beneath them. That 
it is just too blindingly obvious that the idea of being post-truth is 
absurd, and indeed self-contradictory. We are not at all unsympathetic 
to such a thought; part of our motive for putting together this special 
issue has been precisely to show how philosophy in general and broadly 
Wittgensteinian thinking in particular can help undermine the 
discourse of post-truth and bring out absurdities latent or indeed 
patent in it. But we think it unwise simply not to bother to do this. We 
think it unwise to assume that this matter is beneath philosophical 
thinking. We think this primarily for a simple reason: the notion of 
post-truth and various associated terms and catch-phrases are now in 
widespread use, and influential. They demand attention, 
understanding, and criticism, of (inter alia) a philosophical kind. 
Moreover, it is, we would surmise, precisely the neglect of such 
trends as are connoted by words such as ‘post-truth’ that have led to 
their influence. In other words: it is exactly a view among ‘experts’ that 
certain topics are beneath them that has fuelled an anti-elitist revolt 
against expertise. 
If philosophers ‘magisterially’ ignore ideas such as ‘post-truth’, they 
(i.e. we all) risk being in turn ignored, or, indeed, undermined and 
silenced – and the legitimacy of philosophy removed – by the political 
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culture wherein these terms subsist and grow, perniciously. For a 
culture which even entertains the notion that truth is something that 
can be or has been left behind is palpably not a culture in which it will 
be possible for the love of wisdom to flourish. And: a culture that sees 
its philosophers as snooty is a culture well on the way to defunding 
those philosophers. 
In the summer of 2017, a closed symposium was held at the 
University of East Anglia, to address these issues from a broadly 
Wittgensteinian perspective. The majority of the papers in this special 
issue began life in the vital atmosphere of that symposium. We are 
therefore grateful to all participants in the symposium. We further are 
grateful to Juliette Harkin, who, despite her regretted absence from the 
symposium, contributed to building the archive that was rendered 
available to the participants, and, thereby to render this special issue 
possible. 
1. A central concern with a change of the attitude of people 
regarding truth 
‘Word of the year’ in 2016, ‘post-truth’ has since come to be widely 
used as a notion allegedly necessary and adequate to label or 
characterize our epoch. This notion is often presented as means to help 
address contemporary concerns relative to our attitudes with respect 
to truth. Concerns which can be expressed as follows: did our attitudes 
with respect to truth come to radically change with the transformations 
of both our ways of obtaining and sharing information through 
emerging new medias and of their political uses? And if that is the case, 
then how shall we respond to such change? 
The radical nature of the change of our attitudes with respect to 
truth suggested by such approaches raises deep concerns. Such change 
needs to be radical if anyone is to be justified in claiming the beginning 
of a new epoch. Or if it is to be argued that our epoch presents essential 
features that could be brought out and would indicate problems which 
would require replies of theoretical nature (see Ferraris 2019: 12). But, 
as we shall see, it can be argued that the practices allegedly captured 
under the heading of ‘post-truth’ are mostly qualitatively similar to 
earlier ones, and moreover it is also questionable whether quantitative 
augmentation of practices of lying and distraction could suffice to 
Nordic Wittgenstein Review Special Issue 2019 • Post-Truth | pp. 5-22 | 
DOI 10.15845/nwr.v8i1.3508 
7 
 
explain the emergence of - or there being - ‘post-truth’ at all (see Ball 
2017: 9). In short: talk of ‘post-truth’ looks perhaps like merely a new 
way of dressing up old relativisms, and like a way of illegitimately 
suggesting that something radically new has begun. 
Nevertheless, even if that is right, it will be important to 
acknowledge the real difficulties generated by the recent technological 
and political augmentations of false or distorted news. And to 
acknowledge that less progress has perhaps been made in doing this to 
date than should have been. Especially, perhaps, by philosophers. 
The papers in this special issue try between them to strike a right 
balance. To establish how new ‘post-truthism’ really is – or isn’t. To 
seek a point of reflection on whatever is new in our current socio-
political straits. And to consider seriously how philosophy can help. 
Whether by wondering about the extent to which reason, or truth, may 
rightly, if one follows Wittgenstein, be viewed in certain respects as a 
constraint upon thought or opinion. Or indeed by wondering whether 
we still have a long way to go in approaching truth at all. 
2. A reflection on the source of ‘post-truth’ and its 
characterization 
The authors writing in this special issue differ with respect to the issues 
just outlined. But one thing that they mostly have in common is that, 
in their diagnoses of an alleged radical change of our attitudes regarding 
truth, they all tend explicitly or implicitly to critically target what might 
be termed consumeristic attitudes with respect to news specifically (and 
facts more generally) both on the side of their ‘producers’ and 
‘consumers’. And more generally: to see a problem with relativistic and 
subjectivistic trends, in that those trends ape the prevailing norm of a 
market society whereby everything is for sale tailored to the desires of 
the potential purchaser, including, ultimately, opinions. 
And this trend has of course a very real basis in the economics of 
the media. Reporters tend to make compromises they previously did 
not in order to maximize their audience (see Ball 2017: Part II). As an 
extreme example of similar practices, some journalists have yielded to 
the temptation of financing their genuine investigations by producing 
‘fake news’ (see Allison 2017). And a tendency both to select and share 
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news corroborating their own beliefs irrespective of their truth and to 
avoid and dismiss news putting their own beliefs into question has been 
studied (see Ball 2017: 179–198). What eventuates is an extreme 
example of what Wittgenstein had in mind when he worried about the 
tendency of us all, including philosophers, to exhibit a weakness of the 
will when it comes to areas where resistances of the will need to be 
overcome but one does not want to overcome them (CV: 17e). 
D’Ancona puts it as follows:  
This is the defining characteristic of the Post-Truth world. The point is 
not to determine the truth by a process of rational evaluation, assessment 
and conclusion. You choose your own reality, as if from a buffet. You also 
select your own falsehood, no less arbitrarily. (D’Ancona 2017: 56) 
The questions raised by the assertion of ‘post-truth’ thus bear on 
responsibilities involved in practices of news reporting and sharing and 
reception, and of course by production of ‘fake news’; and furthermore 
they also bear on the structure of the means – both technological and 
ideological – by which problematic practices such as that of production 
of ‘fake news’ are rendered possible in the first place (see Viner 2016). 
Indeed, interfaces we use, notably that of social medias, enable 
individuals to receive only news that please them while avoiding news 
that could eventually lead an individual to reassess their own beliefs. 
To this extent, they arguably contribute to the spread of the fantasy of 
an arbitrary yet successful determination of reality by arbitrary selection 
of its constituents. 
3. Appropriate responses that ‘post-truth’ would require 
To which extent can the kinds of difficulties outlined above be the 
responsibility of individuals to rectify? Clearly, it is useful to recall or 
propose ways to adjust individuals’ online practices in order to address 
such concerns (see Ball 2017: 237–256; Brodnig 2017; D’Ancona 2017: 
114). Nevertheless, whether isolated initiatives can suffice to address 
them is doubtful. For, as suggested by Ball, false news takes minutes to 
construct but hours to debunk (Ball 2017: 1). Such that, individual fact-
checking being overall out of question, it can be argued, as D’Ancona 
does, that the implementation of automatized fact-checking provides 
some adequate response to the increase of ‘fake news’ (2017: 116–124). 
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However, concrete difficulties raised by the claim of ‘post-truth’ could 
be both under and overestimated. 
Underestimating them would amount to neglecting the concrete 
character of the uncertainties fed and problems caused both by the 
increasing quantity of candidate-news available online and the novelty, 
the ease and the speed at which they can be distorted or produced from 
scratch. 
Facing these, one could be tempted to see in the implementation of 
new laws the solely appropriate means in order to address the 
difficulties they raise. However, the correlative risk raised by a solely 
juridical approach to these difficulties is that of overestimating them 
(listen Mosna-Savoye 2018; 2019, on the need for a philosophical 
approach). For the counterpart risk is that of the implementation of 
superfluous and liberticidal laws which could be as problematic as that 
which they are meant to enable to address (listen 52 Insights 2017; see 
Riese 2017). Nevertheless, an initiative such as that of openMedia, 
launched in order to investigate and expose commercial interference in 
editorial decisions, could provide another model or approach (see 
Fitzgerald 2017). Indeed, if medias are to remain protected from 
commercial and political pressure in order to accomplish their finalities 
within our societies, then is not it up to journalists to be provided with 
some help in order to work under good conditions? 
For one thing that is clear, from the developments over the last two 
years that have occurred in seeking to expose the manipulations of 
elections and uses of ‘fake news’ and targeted propaganda, is that, 
without serious resources devoted to investigative journalism, these 
anti-democratic practices will flourish. Such investigative journalism 
remains mainly the prerogative of ‘legacy media’ as notably, The 
Guardian in the UK (see Cadwalladr 2017), exactly the quality ‘MSM’ 
(mainstream media) which is most under-threat by the emergence of 
social media and of capitalist platforms such as Google and Facebook. 
Though this goes beyond the scope of most of the papers in this 
special issue, it is clear that a full-spectrum response to the world we 
inhabit, a world which has, for understandable reasons, spawned the 
problematic idea of ‘post-truth’, needs to involve both media reform 
and support for media investigations of the structures that engender 
‘post-truthism’. 
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Our contribution in this special issue includes setting out the 
background conditions – the intellectual backdrop – for under-
standing those needs. 
4. Putting into question the need for the notion of ‘post-
truth’ 
We suggested above that the notion of ‘post-truth’ is often used in 
order to refer to or express various concerns regarding the production 
and the reception of news, our attitude regarding them, their truth and 
the truthfulness of their authors, at the beginning of an epoch of mass 
on-line production. But taken literally, the notion raises under scrutiny 
significant – indeed, blatant – philosophical concerns. For, as 
underlined above, most uses of ‘post-truth’ suggest that our epoch 
would need to be understood by a fairly radical contrast with earlier 
ones, in a way that can be explained as follows: while truth would have 
necessarily belonged to the ingredients or internal composition of past 
epochs, this would not be the case anymore. Such that our epoch could 
need and would need to be understood as one from which truth could 
and would be necessarily or constitutively missing. 
Our initial concern is thus the following: could we possibly need to 
grant that truth could somehow be left behind? Would not doing so 
necessarily lead to dire confusion, in the polity and in principle? Can 
we and do we need to reduce our notion of truth to that of an 
occurrence of an event (which thus could reach an end) rather than, 
say, acknowledging it (as Cavell has taught us) as a property of what we 
say when we mean what we say, that which we must? 
5. Three distinct problematics raised by uses of ‘post-truth’ 
To contribute to common and critical reflexion on such a would-be 
transformed sense of reason and of politics is a central aim of this 
special edition. A common theme of the contributions to our special 
issue is that the very notion of post-truth could prove to be dangerous, 
absurd – but is, in any case, revealing. As we saw, the notion of ‘post-
truth’ is generally meant to constitute a new term of criticism. But to 
which extent does it successfully do so? Can we and should we grant 
that ‘post-truth’ be enjoyed at all (as suggests Cervera-Marzal 2019)? 
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The defense of the belief that we may have entered an epoch of ‘post-
truth’ (see Floyd forthcoming) raises at least three distinct 
problematics, which are each addressed and discussed by pairs of 
contributors in this special issue. 
The first problematic, raised by O. Kuusela in “Domination by 
Reason?”, and to which M. Falomi replies in “A New Problem of 
Domination by Reason”, bears on the question of trust in reason, and 
thereby on the place of thought and speech in societies. Indeed, if 
doubting that there is anything such as logic and reason commits an 
individual to relativism (or subjectivism), then can the philosopher be 
legitimate in their attempts to dispel such relativism without thereby 
implying that individuals would somehow need to submit to or be 
dominated by reason? Can the asymmetry between the one who 
dominates and the one who is dominated implied by any relation of 
domination provide us with a model to reflect on the abstract relation 
between reason and individuals? In short: how to contribute to 
undermine the attraction of relativism? 
The second problematic, raised by L. Finlayson in “What to Do 
with Post-truth” and to which R. Read responds in “What Is New in 
Our Time: The Truth in ‘Post-truth’”, bears on the usefulness of and 
the need for the notion of ‘post-truth’ to address political and 
ecological issues. Does the notion of ‘post-truth’ provide us with 
anything distinct that was not available in terms of criticism which were 
already available to us? If a consumerism with respect to truth, i.e. the 
notion that the truth of a truth could amount to nothing but the result 
of a decision, has rightly been identified with the label of ‘post-truth’, 
does this imply that the very notion of ‘post-truth’ is needed in order 
to make such criticism? Or does this notion instead simply express such 
a consumerism? And if that is not the case, then what does the alleged-
belief of our having entered an epoch of ‘post-truth’ tend to eclipse? 
In short: what in ‘post-truth’ is really new? 
The third problematic, raised by J. Backström in “Pre-truth Life in 
Post-truth Times” and to which H. Strandberg responds in “Life and 
Truth: A Response to Joel Backström”, concerns the truthfulness of 
the denigration of truth implicit in “post-truth”. Indeed if there never 
has been anything as such as an epoch of radical harmony between the 
thoughts of individuals and truths, then could not talking of “post-
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truth” lead one in different respects both to underestimate and 
overestimate the difficulties of the spirit of our time? In short: would 
it not be more accurate to talk of our epoch being pre-truth than post-
truth? 
5.1. First problematic: on trust in reason 
Kuusela seeks to raise and dissolve what he calls “the problem of 
conceptual domination”. He characterizes this problem as one which 
can sometimes legitimately be raised concerning the position of the 
philosopher. Indeed, in virtue of “her more advanced capacity to clarify 
[…] shared concepts or principles of reason”, the philosopher could in 
some contexts come to seem to coerce or force, by means of an 
argument, the interlocutor to accept some clarifications. Kuusela 
underlines that such a problem often arises when a philosopher argues 
or implies that he has “an access to universal or exceptionless theses of 
essence” or to “universally or exceptionlessly valid conceptual 
determinations”. Kuusela wants to establish that Wittgenstein 
establishes a way in which one can avoid falling the trap of seeking to 
dominate by reason, but without “the acceptance of relativism, and 
sacrificing the notions of knowledge and truth”. To establish this, he 
proposes an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s notion of agreement 
according to which “philosophical clarification is genuinely an attempt 
to clarify what the other says in her own terms” such that “philosophy 
involves no attempt to try to force anyone to accept anything”. Rather, 
clarifications would be intended to bring into focus specific aspects of 
our concepts with reference to specific philosophical problems in order 
to address them. And the criterion of clarification as a task would be 
its success. Correlatively, it would be inherently risky to assume in 
philosophy that reality will conform to philosophical theses or systems 
inasmuch as doing so would amount to forgetting and thereby 
neglecting what philosophical models of our (non-philosophical) 
concepts are: means for understanding how things are, nothing more. 
Assuming that the objects of our investigations would correspond to 
our models would risk falsifying reality by means of them. Kuusela thus 
argues that “the problem of conceptual domination” can be dissolved 
by taking into account the historical character of the contexts in which 
specific clarifications responding to specific philosophical problems 
are provided. In such situations, someone could always free themselves 
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from the misleading feeling of being illegitimately constrained by 
recognizing “the value of logic and reason”. Wittgenstein does so; he 
thereby offers us a way of not feeling, as some libertarians seem to do, 
constrained by truth and reason. 
Kuusela’s argument can thus be seen as both helping to explain a 
widespread feeling (of ordinary people as being constrained by experts) 
that has fuelled the emergence of a ‘populist’ discourse of post-truth in 
recent years, and offering a resolution: if, following Wittgenstein, one 
succeeds in showing a way in which reason can be appositely employed 
without its seeking to dominate anyone, then one simultaneously 
removes the rationale for a reactive relativism. 
Falomi replies by suggesting that there actually are two forms of 
domination by reason: domination may be a matter of claiming a 
superior entitlement to voice reasons, or a matter of excluding 
someone from the community of rational thinkers. Kuusela's account 
of Wittgenstein, according to Falomi, successfully defuses domination 
by reason in the first sense. Falomi, in his response, asks however 
whether this account proves to be helpful when it comes to the second 
sense of domination by reason, and concludes that, while the aspects 
of Wittgenstein's philosophy highlighted by Kuusela may not be 
illuminating here, other strands of Wittgenstein's thinking may be 
mobilized against this other form of domination by reason. For a new 
problem of the domination of reason can occur if, in certain 
circumstances, someone who feels deprived of their voice is required 
to clarify themselves in such a way that they may feel as if they are being 
required to no longer be themselves. Falomi’s intends to provide 
means for defusing domination by reason in the second sense by 
studying Wittgenstein’s interest in the limits of clarification. 
The crucial point of the exchange between Kuusela and Falomi is 
this: is there a way of avoiding giving the general public the impression 
that reason is a substantive constraint being imposed upon them from 
without. If there is (as Kuusela argues), then we are in better shape to 
avoid accusations of elitism, and to enable it to be shown how reason 
and truth are inherent in life and language, rather than being something 
which intellectual elites impose on ordinary people for the latter to 
labour under. Falomi’s doubts, if they turn out to be justified, might 
make it harder to show how being ‘post-truth’ or rejecting reason are 
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absurd self-defeating and unnecessary moves. For, according to him, a 
genuine commitment to rationality includes responsiveness to the 
possibility of rejecting reason as a whole (when it has become, as Cavell 
puts it, mere conformity). In that sense, what may be perceived as a 
‘post-truth’ stance may actually be an instance of such wholesale 
rejection of rationality – hence, something internal to a commitment 
to reason. Critics of ‘post-truth’ risk not being alive to this possibility, 
and hence risk of giving a one-sided account of what a commitment to 
reason implies. 
5.2. Second problematic: on what the assertion that we have entered 
an era of ‘post-truth’ is meant to enable us to deny 
Finlayson seeks to raise a “sceptical challenge against the 
distinctiveness and utility of the notion of ‘post-truth’”. She raises the 
question whether the notion of ‘post-truth’ enables us to do anything 
other notions could not, and argues that both what it could do and the 
ways in which it could do it are unclear or yet to be shown. Her own 
view then is that proponents of ‘post-truth’ discourse, i.e. anyone who 
asserts “the post-truth thesis” or claim that “some kind of deep and 
significant shift has occurred […] in people’s relationship to truth” 
risks irrationalizing political disaffection and signaling loyalty to “a ‘pre-
post-truth’ political status quo”. For if, as she argues, the notion of 
‘post-truth’ does not enable us to do anything new, then it risks getting 
in the way of our successfully addressing difficulties of our times (and 
of earlier times) with means we have, and in particular critical notions 
such as ‘media bias’, ‘sensationalism’, ‘propaganda’ or ‘ideology’. 
Thus she opposes her approach to ones such as that of D’Ancona 
who employs ‘post-truth’ as a notion distinct from others like lying, 
propaganda or plain falsehood. In order to substantiate her critical 
diagnosis with respect to the need for and the use of such a notion as 
‘post-truth’ she spells out and confronts three thoughts that could 
tacitly be involved in circumstances in which “the assertion of a ‘post-
truth era’ is made” concerning (i) people’s political opinions, (ii) their 
concern with respect to the truthfulness of their beliefs and their bases, 
and (iii) the interpretation of their attitude with respect to truth more 
generally. Each of these thoughts raise difficulties that Finlayson spells 
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out and confronts in an attempt to show that they do not suffice to 
meet with the sceptical challenge she raises. 
First she confronts the idea that (i) people’s beliefs on politics 
would radically fail to track truth and would rather track something else 
like emotion or fashion. She argues that this idea is in danger of 
multiple self-contradiction and weakens the assumption of democracy 
by leaving unquestionable the decline of the epistemic competence of 
“the public”. Second she confronts the idea that (ii) people could have 
stopped even caring whether their beliefs are true or based on evidence. 
This idea implies that people would have changed so as to become 
completely indifferent with respect both to truth and its bases. She 
suggests that attempting to infer from lived scepticism about ‘experts’ 
or ‘expertise’ to popular indifference among persons with respect to 
the truth-value of their own beliefs is misleading. (iii) Finlayson then 
confronts a third and last idea, according to which people would be 
relativists or would not believe in ‘truth’ itself. This idea implies that 
people’s attitude with respect to truth could and would need to be 
equatable with a philosophical conception of relativism. She suggests 
that doing so is misleading in that it tends to conflate relativism with 
narrow-mindedness. However, affirming that truth may be said in 
some ways to be relative to something (e.g., the speaker’s culture) does 
not amount to suggesting that there is no such thing as truth or that 
the truth of a truth could be meaningfully be equated with the result of 
a decision. Finlayson thus argues that neglecting this contrast amounts 
to confuse relativism with narrow-mindedness. 
As a result, Finlayson suggests that the sceptical challenge she issues 
yet remains to be met with. For none of the identified difficulties which 
would substantiate the claim that we could have shifted to an epoch of 
post-truth suffice to distinguish our epoch from an antecedent one. 
Finlayson thus claims that it can be shown that ‘post-truth’ is only 
a new label for old maladies. Though, drawing upon J.L. Austin, 
Finlayson concludes by sketching how the term post-truth, while 
lacking locutionary purport, has nevertheless been a word powerfully 
used to do certain things: she calls it a “slur word”. A word used to cast 
a slur on the present in a way that makes the past appear better than it 
actually was. She finds it in that regard a dangerous word, that we 
should do without. 
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Rupert Read replies to Finlayson’s challenge by suggesting that 
what is relatively new (though of a vintage closer to perhaps 30 years 
than to 3) is a lack of interest in the claim of truth among many voters, 
and a contempt for truth among those who have, since the rise of 
neoliberalism, deliberately promoted a ‘consumeristic’ attitude toward 
truth. This lack of interest and this contempt are absurd: but we live in 
absurd times. (Does Read therefore commit himself to saying that we 
actually do live in post-truth times? No: he holds that it is as if we do. 
Much like we used to live in times in which it was as if there was a 
God.) Read illustrates his point with reference to the phenomenon of 
climate-change denial, which has been around for a generation now, 
and which has therefore in some quarters been termed “the original 
post-truth”. Read concludes by invoking Wittgenstein on how the real 
problems hereabouts are of the will more than of the intellect. Like 
Kuusela, Read thinks that it is demonstratively absurd for (e.g.) 
libertarians to see truth or reason as substantive constraints upon their 
thinking that may be sloughed off in the name of freedom; but Read 
emphasises that it takes effort and courage, and not just intellectual 
acuity, to demonstrate this in any way that actually matters. 
5.3. Third problematic: on the truthfulness of the alleged concern 
with truth 
J. Backström argues in “Pre-truth life in post-truth times” that one can 
and needs to consider how life was before contemporary concerns with 
‘post-truth’, in order to reassess ‘the spirit of our times’ and to realize 
both the “absolutely crucial” and “inherently unstable” characters of 
the notion of truth. Indeed, while he grants that tracing changes with 
respect to truth in public discourse is necessary in order to understand 
the contemporary socio-political situation, he also argues that 
“rationality” and “truth” appear, collectively and publicly speaking, 
only against a background of pervasive untruth and confusion. In his 
approach, the philosophical task would thus not reside in 
understanding there being “one big lie” but in recognizing what the 
collective “world” constitutes itself against. 
In his attempt to restore the availability or contribute to the birth 
of such discernment, Backström distinguishes between two sorts of 
threats corresponding to two kinds of resistance to truth. People can 
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feel externally threatened by truths affecting their material interests or 
social positions and thus avoid in such cases admitting some facts 
publicly in order to preserve them; but people can also feel in some 
cases existentially threatened by truths affecting their image of 
themselves and of their relation to others and thus avoid admitting how 
things stand in order to preserve it in such cases. Like Read, Backström 
emphasises that facing up to the truth can require great efforts of will; 
it can as a result be therefore, he says, pretty uncommon, rather than 
the norm. Backström suggests that acknowledging truths becomes 
difficult when it involves the feeling of a moral-existential threat. Such that 
moral philosophy needs (i) to take into account the possibility of self-
deception and repression, to (ii) account for and provide clarifications 
or means to address the temptation of self-deception. 
Backström argues that it is the very idea of the respectable which 
needs to be reassessed and explained as one of the “central modes of 
upholding collective fake-intelligibility” inasmuch as it would involve a 
undue focus on ‘appearances’ that would be constitutive of it. Less than 
calling into question the very coherence of the notion, Backström seeks 
to explicitate the way in which accounting for the fact-value distinction 
in terms of a dichotomy can lead an individual to misrepresent his 
relations with others. He indeed suggests that there is a confusion 
which is at the root of ‘post-truth’ and according to which “truth and 
meaning are, basically, something to be determined by someone, and then 
the question would be only who is ‘entitled’ to determine them”. 
According to the metaphysical picture that Backström confronts by 
drawing on Wittgenstein, each individual would first need to be 
‘entitled’ to have one’s (their) own opinions or convictions in order to 
be allowed and right in claiming anything. However, attempting to 
meet such a pre-requisite of self-entitlement raises multiple difficulties 
among which is, centrally, the neglect of the concern with the truthful 
character of the ways in which an individual relates to others. Thus, 
Backström argues that defense of ‘partisan spirit’, resort to violence 
and appeals to ‘meta-perspectives’ are symptomatic of ways in which 
an individual can try without success to repress or hide from oneself 
the destructiveness of one’s own attitude. The difficulty such attitudes 
raises would thus prove to be that of relating to others truthfully. 
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Thus far from resolving such difficulty, appealing to the decisive 
character of communal consensus does not solve but states the 
problem. The opposition between ‘post-truth’ claims and ‘truth’ claims 
(whether conceived as resulting from correspondence or coherence) in 
fact reveals a common assumption, which is that of the primacy of a 
logic of representations, while the plausibility of there being anything 
along these lines is generated by the repression of interpersonal 
understanding, i.e., of the reciprocal understanding of you and I. 
Backström argues this is largely a timeless problem; somewhat like 
Finlayson, he thinks that the newness of ‘post-truth’ is exaggerated. But 
he goes further: he suggests that the true character of our situation is 
(and always was) one of ‘pre-truth’. Talk of ‘post-truth’ rashly implies 
that there was a time in which we were in harmony with ‘truth’. 
Whereas Backström suggests that actually, as we can see in Freud and 
Wittgenstein, there is a permanent pressure in us against facing reality. 
We still, now as before, live before truth. 
Strandberg agrees with Finlayson that the problematic we find 
under the heading of ‘post-truth’ is far from new; he traces it back to 
Hobbes. He disagrees in a certain sense with Read about climate-denial; 
he thinks that the very vehemence of climate-change-deniers evinces 
their caring very much about the truth that they deny. In relation to 
Backström, Strandberg ties these strands together by taking up the 
political and necessarily inter-subjective nature of concern with truth 
and truthfulness. Strandberg agrees with Backström’s critique of ‘post-
truth’ as too complacent an idea and with his thought that ‘pre-truth’ 
would be a more accurate label for our era (as for every era) than post-
truth; but he suggests that it is essential to think this truth in the agora, 
in civil society. Strandberg can be read as suggesting that Wittgenstein’s 
suggestion that “Working in philosophy […] is really more work on 
oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things” 
(CV: 16e) needs expanding, in the following way: we need to 
understand that the kind of work needed to overcome the temptations 
of post-truthism and of the complacent assumption, among most critics 
of the ‘post-truth’ turn, that we know the truth is work that we need to 
do. There is a danger in Wittgenstein’s approach that the essentially 
inter-personal nature of this work is downplayed. A truthful life is a life 
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lived truly in relation to others in a socio-political setting, not only in 
private. 
6. ‘Fake-news’ 
In the essays in this special issue, we thus approach issues raised by 
‘post-truth’ from three angles: that of (investigating) a distrust in reason 
and the philosophizing it involves, that of the usefulness (or otherwise) 
of the notion to address the issues it can be and has been used to refer 
to, and that of the relevance of the notion to address the issues it can 
be used to refer to (in contrast to alternative possible notions such as 
‘pre-truth’). 
Extending what is begun in Finlayson’s essay, below, we wish to 
offer one short conclusive reflection on risks relative to uses of the 
term of ‘fake-news’. 
To say of a news that it is false can, according to circumstances, 
amount either to legitimately challenging its truth or illegitimately 
casting doubt upon the reliability of an information and its source. And 
when for example evidence or reliable credentials are lacking, it can be 
appropriate to acknowledge that we are unable to determine whether 
some news is false. However, to underline that does not amount to 
granting that one could always relevantly doubt the reliability of each 
of our certainties in every circumstance. By calling into question our 
very ability to distinguish reasons to trust in others such talk often leads 
to call into question what Austin called “the, or one main, point of 
talking”, that is, believing persons, accepting testimony (1979: 82). 
If such scepticism as to testimony were to become widespread, this 
would amount to a partial disintegration of society itself. We think that 
this shows the gravity of the present situation – and the need for a 
special issue such as this. 
We hope that readers will enjoy the essays collected here. But more 
than that: we hope that these essays about widespread but highly-
problematic notions provide a basis for taking our culture a little close 
to the truth of the matter. For, obviously, enjoyment in matters of 
public political philosophy is not enough. As Wittgenstein remarks in 
Culture and Value: “You could attach prices to thoughts. Some cost a 
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lot, some a little. And how does one pay for thoughts? The answer, I 
think, is: with courage” (CV: 52e). 
 
  
Nordic Wittgenstein Review Special Issue 2019 • Post-Truth | pp. 5-22 | 
DOI 10.15845/nwr.v8i1.3508 
21 
 
References 
52 Insights, 2017. A Post Truth World: Interview with Matthew d’Ancona [podcast], 
22 September 2017. Available at: https://www.52-
insights.com/news/podcast-listen-post-truth-world-interview-matthew-
dancona-fake-news/ [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Allison, S., 2017, “The Zimbabwean Journalist Using Fake News to Fund Real 
News”. Mail & Guardian, 14 July 2017. Available at: 
https://mg.co.za/article/2017-07-14-00-the-zimbabwean-journalist-
using-real-news-to-fund-fake-news/ [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Austin, J. L., 1979. “Other Minds”. In: J. L. Austin, Philosophical Papers, 3rd ed., 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 76–116. 
Ball, J., 2017. Post-Truth: How Bullshit Conquered the World. London: Biteback 
Publishing. 
Brodnig, I., 2017. “Wie sich Lügen im Netz verbreiten”. Süddeutsche Zeitung, 19 
June 2017. Available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/digital/ingrid-
brodnig-wie-sich-luegen-im-netz-verbreiten-1.3550735 [accessed: 3 May 
2019]. 
Cadwalladr, C., 2017. “Robert Mercer: The Big Data Billionaire Waging War on 
Mainstream Media”. The Guardian, 26 February 2017. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2017/feb/26/robert-mercer-
breitbart-war-on-media-steve-bannon-donald-trump-nigel-farage 
[accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Cervera-Marzal, M., 2019. Post-Vérité: Pourquoi Il Faut S’en Réjouir. Lormont: Le 
Bord de L’eau. 
D’Ancona, M., 2017. Post-Truth: The New War on Truth and How to Fight Back. 
London: Ebury Press. 
Ferraris, M., 2019. Post Vérité et Autres Énigmes. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France. 
Fitzgerald, M., 2017. “Why We’re Launching openMedia”. openDemocracy, 29 
November 2017.  Available at: 
https://www.opendemocracy.net/openmedia/mary-fitzgerald/welcome-
to-openmedia [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Floyd, J., forthcoming. “‘The True’ in Journalism”. In: J. E. Katz, ed., Journalism 
and the Search for Truth. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Mosna-Savoye, G., 2018. “Comment lutter contre les fake news?” [podcast]. 
France Culture, 15 February 2018. Available at: 
https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-journal-de-la-philo/le-
journal-de-la-philo-du-jeudi-15-fevrier-2018 [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Mosna-Savoye, G., 2019. “#nouveauconcept : la post-vérité" [podcast]. France 
Culture, January 24, 2019. Available at: 
https://www.franceculture.fr/emissions/le-journal-de-la-
philo/nouveauconcept-la-post-verite [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Rupert Read & Timur Uçan  CC-BY 
22 
 
Riese, D. 2017. “Studie zu Manipulation im Netz: Die neue Propaganda”. 
Frankfurter Allgemeine, 22 June, 2018. Available at: 
http://www.faz.net/1.5071024 [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Viner, K., 2016. “How Technology Disrupted the Truth”. The Guardian, July 12, 
2016. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2016/jul/12/how-technology-
disrupted-the-truth [accessed: 3 May 2019]. 
Wittgenstein, L., 1984. Culture and Value. P. Winch, trans. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press. (CV) 
 
Biographical Note 
Rupert Read is Reader in Philosophy at the University of East Anglia, 
specialist in philosophy of language, philosophy of science, and 
environmental philosophy. His published works include Kuhn (co-
authored, 2002), Applying Wittgenstein (2007), Philosophy for Life (2007), There 
is No Such Thing as a Social Science (2008), Wittgenstein Among the Sciences 
(2012), A Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes (2012) and A Film-Philosophy of 
Ecology and Enlightenment (2018). His editorial experience includes The New 
Hume Debate (co-edited, 2000), Film as Philosophy: Essays on Cinema after 
Wittgenstein and Cavell (2005), and The New Wittgenstein (2000). 
 
Timur Uçan teaches philosophy at Bordeaux Montaigne University and 
at the Highschool of Image and Sound of Angoulême. He wrote a PhD 
on the issue of Solipsism in the Early Works of Sartre and Wittgenstein 
(2016). He co-edited Wittgenstein and Phenomenology (Routledge, 2018). 
 
